As a result of my reviewing more than 30 inquiries into nuclear energy (Chapter 15), and especially my active participation in several of them, I reached my own conclusions on what had been done wrong and, more constructively, how to avoid the repetition of past mistakes in future inquiries. What precipitated this analysis of lessons to be learned was the appalling performance of the Panel on Nuclear Fuel Wastes (Chapter 9). Since this is the latest inquiry it presumably represents the current thinking of the Canadian Government on the conduct of such inquiries. Thus the lessons, while having general application, are worded in terms of that experience. Some other lessons, learned from the failure of the Siting Task Forces for the management of low-level radioactive wastes, were noted in Chapter 9.
The inquiries reviewed covered a wide spectrum of styles, from parliamentary committees, through royal commissions and a self-appointed religious organization, to major international studies. A comparison provides some interesting conclusions, subject to the usual reservations regarding generalizations. An inquiry presided over by someone trained in the law is judicial in style, with the person making a clear judgement of the issue based on the evidence presented. An inquiry composed largely of academics tends to be more "ambidextrous" (on the one hand this, on the other hand that), providing many statements that can be quoted selectively by proponents and opponents. The more individuals that are involved in preparing the report, the less clear-cut are the conclusions. An international inquiry, representing many diverse national policies, can only reach general conclusions to achieve consensus. The most useful reports, and those of longest lasting value, are those that analyse the arguments, render judgements and provide reasons for the judgements. The durations of the inquiries varied greatly. Here the conclusion is that there is no free lunch. To do justice to these topics takes many months, up to a few years, even for the approval of a specific plant.
My review provides illustrations of some useful techniques for conducting an inquiry. Several inquiries have held preliminary, relatively informal, hearings to help them establish the scope of the inquiry. Some have at the start translated their general terms of reference into precise questions that were later answered in the conclusions of the final report. One required participants to conduct specific tests to resolve differences that arose in the inquiry. The integrity of another was enhanced by two independent review panels, appointed by the Royal Society of Canada (which incorporates the Academy of Science). Some of the international and U.S. inquiries with very large membership have used the technique of multiple scenarios that demonstrate the consequences of certain options, to avoid the necessity of achieving consensus in predicting supply and demand, or in recommending politically divisive policies.
In what follows, in making recommendations on how the lessons learned from past experience could be applied to future inquiries I use "the commission" and "commissioners" as generic terms to distinguish them from the Panel on Nuclear Fuel Wastes and its members. The issue is discussed under the following headings:
Nature and Composition of the Inquiry
Information on Panel Activities
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